We propose a new optimal location-based beamforming (LBB) scheme for the wiretap channel, where both the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are subject to Rician fading. In our LBB scheme, the two key inputs are the location of the legitimate receiver and the location of the potential eavesdropper. Notably, our scheme does not require any channel state information of the main channel or the eavesdropper's channel being available at the transmitter. This makes our scheme easy to deploy in a host of application settings in which the location inputs are known. Our beamforming solution assumes a multipleantenna transmitter and a multiple-antenna eavesdropper, and its aim is to maximize the physical layer security of the channel. To obtain our solution, we first derive the secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme in an easy-to-evaluate expression that is valid for arbitrary real values of the Rician K -factors of the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel. Using this expression, we then determine the location-based beamformer solution that minimizes the secrecy outage probability. To assess the usefulness of our new scheme, and to quantify the value of the location information to physical layer security, we compare our scheme to other schemes, some of which do not utilize any location information. Our new beamformer solution provides optimal physical layer security for a wide range of location-based applications.
Location-Based Beamforming for Enhancing Secrecy
in Rician Wiretap Channels [4] - [13] ). However, many of the works in MIMO wiretap channels assume the (instantaneous) channel state information (CSI) of the main channel (the channel between Alice and Bob) is perfectly known by Alice (e.g., [4] - [6] ). This assumption is usually very difficult to justify in practice. Also, feeding back the CSI of the main channel from Bob to Alice costs large feedback overhead. Other assumptions adopted in the literature are that the statistical CSI of the eavesdropper's channel (the channel between Alice and Eve) is known to Alice (e.g., [8] , [9] , [14] ), or even more unrealistically the full CSI of the eavesdropper's channel is known to Alice (e.g., [7] ). Such assumptions are usually made simply for tractable analysis of the problem, but can rarely be justified in pragmatic systems. In this work we will not adopt such strong assumptions regarding the nature of the eavesdropper's channel.
In practice, there are many circumstances where location information of Bob and/or Eve could be available. For example, in cellular networks a base station can request a legitimate mobile user to feedback its location information (the mobile user can obtain its own location through GPS, for example). In comparison, estimation and feedback of the full CSI of a channel cost a relatively larger amount of system resources, and accurate estimation of the CSI may not be achieved in massive MIMO techniques due to pilot contamination issues [15] - [18] . Alice can potentially know Eve's location through some form of a priori surveillance (e.g., [19] , [20] ). For instance, in a military environment enemy locations can be determined via visual or electronic reconnaissance. Other circumstances in which Eve's location is known could be where Bob and Eve are normal users of the system served by Alice (but still requiring secret communications on an individual basis), with their location information being routinely broadcasted as per the requirements of a specific network protocol. Examples of such circumstances would be in IEEE 1609.2 for vehicular networks, or in some location-based social-media applications. We also note that the application scenarios of interest can be extended to circumstances where only Bob or Eve's location is available at Alice.
Regardless of the application scenario, the main point we focus on here is that if there is a line-of-sight (LOS) component in the main channel or the eavesdropper's channel, it is possible to utilize location information directly in order to enhance the physical layer security. More specifically, we propose and analyze a new Location-Based Beamforming (LBB) scheme in the wiretap channel, where both the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are subject to Rician fading. Our scheme does not require the CSI of either the main channel or the eavesdropper's channel being available at Alice -thus making it quite general, as well as pragmatic. The basic modus operandi of the scheme we propose is that given the input locations of Bob and/or Eve, we output the optimal beamformer solution and the security level (the secrecy outage probability) associated with this solution. These outputs are dependent on the locations of Bob and Eve through path loss (distance) and angle-of-arrival of the incoming wave front, and thus we refer to our scheme as the LBB scheme. Detailing how these outputs are determined forms the core of our work. 1 Surprisingly, there has been little previous work in this area, with the closest works perhaps those of [21] and [22] . In [21] , the ergodic secrecy rate was examined for multiple-antenna wiretap channels with Rician fading. However, in [21] it was assumed that the CSI of the main channel was perfectly known by Alice. The work of [22] analyzed the secrecy performance of orthogonal space-time block codes when the main channel is assumed to be subject to a special Rician fading (the Rician K -factor equals one), but with the eavesdropper's channel subject to pure Rayleigh fading. That is, in [22] no LOS component between Alice and Eve exists. This means Eve's location information would not be useful in the design of transmission schemes at Alice. Different from [22] we consider the scenario where the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are subject to general Rician fading (the Rician K -factors of the two channels can be arbitrary real values). In many circumstances the secrecy outage probability for a Rician-fading eavesdropper's channel is higher than the outage probability for a Rayleigh-fading eavesdropper's channel (i.e. Eve prefers that a LOS component exists between her and Alice). We note that in such circumstances it is more probable that the eavesdropper's channel is subject to Rician fading (since Eve would try to select a location that ensures a LOS component between her and Alice). We also note that the Rician-fading channel with small values of the Rician K -factor can be utilized to approximate a Rayleigh-fading channel. Therefore, our system model is more general than that considered in [22] .
The direction of this paper and our contributions are summarized as follows. (i) We first derive the secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme in an easy-to-evaluate expression, which is valid for arbitrary real values of the Rician K -factors of the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel. (ii) We then determine the optimal location-based beamformer and the minimum secrecy outage probability for the scheme. (iii) In order to fully appreciate the gains of the LBB scheme, we also analyze, for comparison, the secrecy performance of a Non-Beamforming (NB) scheme. (iv) As a final comparison, we also consider the effect on the LBB scheme of the full CSI of Bob being made available to Alice, and the effect of Eve's location information becoming untrustworthy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II details our system model; Section III provides our analytical solutions; Section IV provides numerical simulations; and Section VI draws concluding remarks. Secrecy performances of the comparison schemes are provided in Appendices. We adopt the following notations in this work. Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols. Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex number z, |z| denotes the modulus of z. Given a complex vector x, x denotes the Euclidean norm, x T denotes the transpose of x, x † denotes the conjugate transpose of x, and Re(x) denotes the real part of x. The L × L identity matrix is referred to as I L and E[·] denotes expectation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our LBB scheme was examined for the simpler case of a pure LOS channel in one of our previous works [19] . Here, we expand on that simple scenario by considering more generic and realistic Rician fading channels. We note that the Rician fading channel model is more general than the widely used Rayleigh fading channel model, i.e., the Rayleigh fading channel is a special case of the Rician fading channel with a zero Rician K -factor. We assume K B > 0 and K E > 0, where K B and K E are the Rician K -factors of the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel, respectively. In this work, we consider not only the single-antenna Bob scenario but also the multiple-antenna Bob scenario. A single-antenna Bob has been widely adopted in previous investigations of physical layer security (e.g., [21] , [23] , [24] ), since in some scenarios a low-complexity receiver structure is more relevant (e.g., low-cost sensor devices). A multiple-antenna Bob requires additional hardware and more sophisticated signal processing techniques. The wiretap channel of interest is illustrated in Fig. 1 , where Alice and Eve are equipped with uniform linear arrays (ULAs) with N A and N E antenna elements, 2 respectively. As we will show later, our analysis provided in this work is also valid for other antenna arrays beyond ULAs at Eve.
As shown in Fig. 1 , we adopt the polar coordinate system, where Alice's location is selected as the origin, Bob's location is denoted as (d B , θ B ), and Eve's location is denoted as (d E , θ E ). For presentation convenience, without other statements we assume that the coordinate system is set up such that 0 ≤ θ B ≤ π and 0 ≤ θ E ≤ π . The orientation of the ULA at Alice is also shown in this figure. We also assume that the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are subject to quasi-static Rician fading with equal block length but different Rician K -factors, and that a K -factor map (K as a function of locations) is known in the vicinity of Alice via some a priori measurement campaigns. We further assume that the CSI of the main channel is unknown to Alice, but that Bob's location is known to Alice. 3 Additional assumptions are that Eve knows the CSI of the eavesdropper's channel and the beamformer adopted by Alice; that Eve applies Maximum Ratio Combining (MRC) in order to maximize the probability of successful eavesdropping [8] , [9] ; and that Eve's location is known to Alice. As we discuss later, our analysis also covers the case where Eve's location is unavailable at Alice. We note that the assumptions that Eve knows the CSI of channel between her and Alice, and the beamformer adopted by Alice, are widely adopted in the literature on physical layer security (e.g., [4] , [7] , [9] ). This is due to the fact that we normally investigate security issues from a conservative point of view, and this assumption captures the worst-case scenario. Note also, that under the conservative worst-case scenario, Eve knows everything that is known by Alice. As such, we will also assume Eve can determine the optimal beamformer.
As per the aforementioned assumptions, the 1 × N A main channel vector is given by
where h o is the LOS component, and h r is the scattered component. The entries of h r are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., h r ∼ CN(0, I N A ). Denoting ρ A as the space between two antenna elements of the ULA at Alice, h o is given by [25] 
where τ A = 2π f 0 ρ A /c, f 0 is the carrier frequency, and c is the speed of propagation of the plane wave. The N E × N A eavesdropper's channel matrix is given by
where G o is the LOS component, and G r is the scattered component represented by a matrix with i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. Although G o is a rank-1 matrix, we highlight that G is not rank-1 since G r is full-rank. Given the locations of Alice and Eve, G o can be written as [26] 
where r o and g o are the array responses at Eve and Alice, respectively, which are given by
In (5), we have τ E = 2π f 0 ρ E /c, where ρ E is the space between two antenna elements of the ULA at Eve, and φ E is the direction of arrival from Eve to Alice which is dependent on the orientation of the ULA at Eve. As we show later, the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) of the eavesdropper's channel is independent of φ E when Eve utilizes MRC to combine the received signals. As such, the secrecy performance of the LBB scheme does not depend on φ E and thus Alice does not have to know φ E . The received signal at Bob is given by
where g(d B ) is the path loss component of the main channel given by g(
is a reference distance and η B is the path loss exponent 4 of the main channel), b is a normalized beamformer (i.e., b = 1), x is the Gaussian distributed information bearing signal satisfying E[|x| 2 ] = P (P is the total transmit power of Alice 5 ), and n B is the additive white Gaussian noise of the main channel with zero mean and variance σ 2 B . Likewise, the received signal at Eve is given by
where g(d E ) is the path loss component of the eavesdropper's channel given by
the path loss exponent of the eavesdropper's channel), and n E is the additive white Gaussian noise vector of the eavesdropper's channel with zero mean and variance matrix σ 2 E I N E , i.e., n E ∼ CN(0, σ 2 E I N E ) Then, the SNR of the main channel is given by
where γ B is defined as γ B Pg(d B )/σ 2 B . Assuming Eve applies MRC to combine the received signals at different antennas, the SNR of the eavesdropper's channel is given by
where
III. LOCATION-BASED BEAMFORMING SCHEME
In this section we first examine the secrecy performance of our proposed LBB scheme in terms of the secrecy outage probability and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity. We then determine the optimal location-based beamformer of the LBB scheme that minimizes the secrecy outage probability.
A. Preliminaries
In order to derive the secrecy performance metrics of our scheme (e.g., the secrecy outage probability), we first derive the probability density functions (pdfs) of γ B and γ E . Without loss of generality, we derive such pdfs for a general b, which is independent of h r and G r . To this end we first determine the distribution type of |hb|. As per (1), we have
Since b is independent of h r ,h r is still a circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variable. Noting thath o is deterministic, we conclude that |hb| follows a Rician distribution. We next determine the parameters of this Rician distribution. Following (11), we have
and
We note that |h o | 2 is the power of the LOS (deterministic) component and E[|h r | 2 ] is the average power of the non-LOS (random) component. As such, we conclude that
follows a Rician distribution with K B and γ B as the Rician Kfactor and total power, respectively, where K B and γ B are given by
The pdf of a Rician random variable involves the zero-order modified Bessel function of the first kind, which is not suitable for further analysis (e.g., deriving the secrecy outage probability). To make progress, it is convenient to interpret the Rician fading as a special case of Nakagami fading. As such, the pdf of γ B is approximated as [27] 
where m B is the Nakagami fading parameter given by
, is the Gamma function. As we have numerically verified, the approximation accuracy of (16) is very high, and this accuracy increases as K B increases.
Following (10), the SNR of the eavesdropper's channel can be rewritten as
where γ E,i = γ E |g i b| 2 , g i is the 1 × N A channel vector between Eve's i-th antenna and Alice, i.e., g i is the i-th row of G. As per (3), we have
As such, following a procedure similar to that used in obtaining f γ B (γ ), the pdf of γ E,i can be approximated as
where m E is given by m E = ( K E + 1) 2 /(2 K E + 1), K E is given by K E = |g o b| 2 K E , and γ E is given by
Since γ E,i is independent from each other, following (21) the pdf of γ E can be approximated as
Following (19), we note that γ E is independent of r o . This indicates that the SNR at Eve is independent of φ E when Eve adopts MRC to combine the received signals. As such, we do not need to know the orientation of the ULA at Eve for our analysis. This also reveals that the SNR at Eve is independent of the type of antenna array at Eve (e.g., other antenna arrays beyond ULAs) since different antenna arrays at Eve only impact r o . As such, our following analysis is also valid for other antenna arrays at Eve (e.g., non-uniform linear arrays, circular arrays, rectangle arrays).
B. Secrecy Performance of the LBB Scheme
In the wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is defined as
is the capacity of the main channel and C E = log 2 (1 + γ E ) is the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel. Since C E is unavailable at Alice, the perfect secrecy cannot be guaranteed in the wiretap channel of interest. For this reason we adopt the secrecy outage probability and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as our secrecy performance metrics. The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability of the secrecy capacity C s being less than the target secrecy rate R s (bits/channel-use), which can be formulated as [8] , [9] 
We now derive the secrecy outage probability for the LBB scheme in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme for a given R s is
where G (·) is the generalized gamma function (also valid for negative integers), which is given by [29] 
Proof: Substituting (16) into (24),
where γ (α, μ) = μ 0 e −t t α−1 dt, Re{α} > 0, is the lower incomplete gamma function. In order to obtain the result in (27) , we have utilized the following identity [30, Eq. (3. 
We note that our pdfs of γ B and γ E given by (16) and (22), respectively, are valid for arbitrary real values of K B and K E . In terms of theoretical analysis, this means the power/exponent parameters (e.g.,m B − 1, N Em E − 1) in these pdfs are arbitrary real values. The presence of such real numbers results in considerable challenges in solving the integral given in (27) . This is due to the fact that (27) now involves several types of functions (e.g., Gamma functions, lower incomplete gamma functions, and exponential functions). All these issues will lead to complications in the following derivations.
To make progress, we adopt the following identity to expand γ (α, μ) [30, Eq. (8.354 
.
As per (29), we have
in which the identity [30, Eq. (1.110)]
is employed. Substituting (22) and (30) into (27), we have
We then obtain the desirable result in (25) by solving the integral in (32) as per the following identity [30, Eq. (3.381 
We first note the secrecy outage probability derived in (25) is a function of Bob and Eve's locations and the beamformer b, all of which are embedded in the parameters m B , m E , γ B , and γ E . We also note that (25) is valid for arbitrary real m B and m E ( m B and m E can be equal), and thus (25) is valid for arbitrary real K B and K E . Although (25) is by construction bounded by 1, it does involve two infinite series. However, these two series can both be approximated by finite series accurately. This is due to the fact that (25) is convergent, as we now discuss. The two infinite series, +∞ n=0 and +∞ l=0 , involved in (25) arise from (29) and (31), respectively. But, we note that (31) is utilized only to expand individual terms (i.e., within each n-th summation term) within (29) . Therefore, as long as (29) is convergent we can conclude (25) is convergent. As proven elsewhere, (29) is indeed convergent [31] . As such, we can conclude that (25) is convergent (we have also numerically confirmed this).
In order to calculate O(R s ) efficiently, we adopt O(R s , N , L) as an approximation. This closed-form approximation to O(R s ) is obtained by truncating its +∞ n=0 and +∞ l=0 series at the Nth and L-th terms, respectively. We have numerically confirmed O(R s , N , L) offers accurate approximation even with small values of N and L.
as the relative approximation error (where O(R s ) is the numerically evaluated result of (27) and the evaluation error of (27) is less than 10 −12 ), our numerical verifications indicate that is less than 10% even when N = L = 5. Furthermore, decreases significantly as N increases. For example, is around 10 −3 for N = 10 and L = 5; and is around 10 −6 for N = 20 and L = 5. In addition to the computational advantages offered by a truncated approximation to (25) , we also note that this approximation represents a lower bound to the secrecy outage probability.
Moreover, we note that we can draw many useful insights from the derivation of (25) , which cannot be obtained by numerically evaluating (27) . For example, following a similar procedure to derive (25) we can determine the secrecy diversity order and secrecy coding gain of our LBB scheme. The secrecy diversity order is an important performance parameter associated with the secrecy outage probability, which determines the slope of the curve for the secrecy outage probability (in dB) versus γ B (in dB) as γ B → ∞ for finite γ E . Mathematically, the secrecy diversity order for finite γ E is defined as
The secrecy diversity order of the LBB scheme is presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The secrecy diversity order of the LBB scheme at fixed γ E is m b , i.e. β = m b .
Following a procedure similar to that used in deriving the secrecy diversity order of the antenna selection schemes presented in [8] , [9] , we can obtain in a straightforward manner the secrecy diversity order of the LBB scheme as m B . As such, we omit the proof of the above corollary here. We note that maximum value of m B is (
The secrecy diversity order given in (34) is widely utilized in the literature (e.g., [32] , [33] ), and to be consistent with other works we will adopt this definition as well. However, we do note it is only formally defined for γ B → ∞ at fixed γ E . It is therefore most useful in special cases, such as when Bob approaches very close to Alice whilst Eve remains at a fixed distance further from Alice. Note also, the secrecy diversity order will be zero if γ E → ∞, since the secrecy outage probability will be zero for γ E → ∞ [32] . Following Corollary 1 and the definition of m B , we know that the secrecy diversity order of the LBB scheme is related to the Rician K -factor of the main channel (i.e., the secrecy diversity order increases as K B increases). Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the channel quality increases as K B increases. Theoretically, this is due to the fact that the pdf of γ B given in (16) involves the term γ m B −1 . In order to derive the secrecy diversity order, we have to obtain the asymptotic pdf of γ B based on the Taylor series expansion, in which γ m B −1 remains in the non-zero term. We note that a similar conclusion was drawn for Nakagami fading channels in [8] , which states that the secrecy diversity order increases as the Nakagami fading parameter of the main channel increases.
Then, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity of the LBB scheme is presented in the following corollary, which is defined as the probability that a positive secrecy capacity is achieved.
Corollary 2: The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity of the LBB scheme is given by
Proof: As per the definition, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity can also be formulated as
Substituting R s = 0 into (25), we obtain the desirable result in (35) . We note that the expression for the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity is simpler than that for the secrecy outage probability and it only involves one infinite series. This infinite series can also be approximated by truncating it at a finite number. This approximation is very accurate even when the truncating number is small (e.g., 10). We now extend our analysis by considering multiple antennas at Bob. Various combining techniques can be applied at a multiple-antenna Bob. Here, we restrict ourselves to the MRC technique and derive an easy-toevaluate expression for the secrecy outage probability. We note that MRC requires the CSI of the main channel being available at Bob. We also note that in our following analysis we assume Alice still transmits a single data stream to Bob.
Following a similar procedure to derive (22) , the pdf of the SNR at Bob, who is equipped with multiple antennas and applies MRC to combine the received signals, can be approximated by
where N B denotes the number of antennas at Bob. Then, following a similar procedure as given in the proof of Theorem 1 we derive the secrecy outage probability for the multiple-antenna Bob to be
We note that the expression present in (38) provides a lower bound for the secrecy outage probability if some other combining technique other than MRC is utilized at Bob. This is due to the fact that MRC maximizes the SNR at Bob relative to other combining techniques. Comparing (37) with (16) we can see that the N B antennas at Bob increase both m B and γ B by a factor of N B . Therefore, multiple antennas result in the secrecy outage probability given in (38) being lower than that given in (25) . The values of m B and γ B impact the optimal location-based beamformer. As such, the optimal locationbased beamformer for a single-antenna Bob is different from that for a multiple-antenna Bob.
C. Optimal Location-Based Beamformer
A location-based beamformer can be written as
where ψ (0 ≤ ψ ≤ π ) is the beamforming direction. In this work we define the optimal location-based beamformer, b * , as the one that minimizes the secrecy outage probability for a given R s . Therefore, defining
and setting ψ = ψ * in (39) completely determine the optimal beamformer b * . We note that the value range of ψ is selected based on the symmetric property of the ULA (e.g., ψ = π/3 and ψ = −π/3 lead to the same beamformer b). We note that (40) is a one-dimensional optimization problem, which can be solved through Algorithm 1 given below. We note ψ * obtained through Algorithm 1 approaches the true optimal value of ψ as N , L, and I increase. Using Algorithm 1 we find a solution is obtained well below 1 second on an average processor for N = 50, L = 50, and I = 1000. For all intents and purposes this solution is optimal. We would like to highlight that ψ * can be analytically determined in some special cases as detailed in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: For K E > 0, the (multiple) solution to (40) is ψ * = arccos cos θ E + 2n A π N A τ A , n A = 1, . . . , N A − 1, in the following cases: (i) when γ E → ∞ for finite γ B , (ii) when K B = 0, or (iii) when θ B is unavailable at Alice.
Proof: For all the cases in the corollary, γ B is of little impact on the secrecy outage probability or it is out of control of b. As such, b is to minimize γ E for these cases. To this end, ψ * is to minimize |g o b| 2 due to the expression of γ E given in (17) . Denoting ν E = τ A (cos θ E − cos ψ), as per (6) and (39), for ν E = 0 we have
For ν E = 0, we have g o b = √ N A . Then, following (41) we have
where F(·, ·) is defined as
It can be proved that the minimum value of F(N x , ν x ) is achieved when ν x = 2n x π for n x = 1, . . . , N x − 1, which is also confirmed by Fig. 2 . As such, |g o b| 2 is minimized when ν E = 2n A π for n A = 1, . . . , N A − 1, and thus we obtain Corollary 3. Intuitively, the solution to (40) is ψ * = θ B for K B > 0 in the following cases: (i) when γ B → ∞ for finite γ E , (ii) when K E = 0, or (iii) when θ E is unavailable at Alice. This is due to the fact that the best Alice can do is to enhance the main channel quality when γ E of little impact on the secrecy outage probability or out of control of b. We note that for ψ * = θ B we have b * = h † o / √ N A and |h o b| 2 = N A . As such, we have 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we present numerical simulations to verify our secrecy performance analysis of the LBB scheme, and examine the impact of different system parameters (e.g., K B , K E , γ B , and γ E ) on the LBB scheme. To better illustrate the gains obtained by our LBB scheme, we will also present simulations of the secrecy performances of the NB (non-beamforming) scheme and the full-CSI scheme. The NB scheme represents the case when an isotropic beamforming pattern is produced by Alice (see Appendix A for an analytical analysis of this scheme). The full-CSI scheme represents the case when the maximum ratio transmission based on the CSI of the main channel is adopted by Alice (see Appendix B for an analytical analysis of this scheme). To conduct simulations, we deploy Bob and Eve at specific locations and then map such locations into γ B and γ E , respectively. Such a mapping is based on Alice's transmit power (i.e., P) and path loss exponents of the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel (i.e., η B and η E ). For presentation convenience, we only specify the values of γ B and γ E adopted in our following simulations. We note that in the following figures we use "Theo" and "Simu" as the abbreviations of "Theoretic" and "Simulated", respectively. We also note that only the following Fig. 3 (in which we pick an arbitrary beamformer b) is generated under Nakagami fading channels. This is done simply to verify our theoretical analysis provided in Theorem 1. As such, Fig. 3 will not be used to draw any insights on the performance of different schemes. All other figures are generated under Rician fading channels.
In Fig. 3 we first verify our derived secrecy outage probabilities for Nakagami fading channels. To this end, we generate channel realizations as per the Nakagami fading channel, where we have set m B = 2m B , m E = m E , γ B = 3γ B , and γ E = γ E , where m B = (K B + 1) 2 /(2K B + 1) and m E = (K E + 1) 2 /(2K E + 1). The theoretic secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme, O(R s ), the secrecy outage probability of the NB scheme, denoted as O NB (R s ), and the secrecy outage probability of the full-CSI scheme, denoted as O CSI (R s ), Recall that for mathematical convenience, our analysis approximates a Rician channel with a Nakagami channel. To see the effect of this, in Fig. 4 we plot the secrecy outage probabilities of the LBB, NB, and full-CSI schemes, for specific Rician fading channels. Note, in the full-CSI scheme Eve's location is unknown to Alice. In this figure, we observe that the simulated minimum secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme, O * (R s ), the secrecy outage probability of , respectively, thus confirming the validity of our channel approximation. We note that we have set θ E close to θ B in Fig. 4 (i.e., θ B = π/3 and θ E = π/4). The gap between O * (R s ) and O NB (R s ) can even be larger when θ E is not so close to θ B . We also observe that O * (R s ) is lower than O CSI (R s ), which indicates that the LBB scheme outperforms the full-CSI scheme. This is related to the fact that Alice knows Eve's location in the LBB scheme only (i.e., Alice does not know Eve's location in the NB and full-CSI scheme). However, we highlight that this comparison result is only valid for these specific system settings. Perhaps a more fairer comparison between the LBB and full-CSI schemes is provided in Fig. 6 , where we adopt a modified LBB scheme, referred to as LBB u , in which Eve's location is unknown to Alice.
In Fig. 5 , we plot the minimum secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme, O * (R s ), versus different values of θ E . Again we observe that the theoretic O * (R s ) matches extremely well the simulated O * (R s ), which again confirms the validity of our analysis. Fig. 5 is also useful in that it more visually represents how the minimum secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme depends on the locations of Bob and Eve. For example, O * (R s ) is maximized when θ B = θ E . In the simulations to obtain Fig. 5 , we also observe that the optimal beamforming direction ψ * shifts away from θ B as θ E approaches to θ B .
In Fig. 6 we examine the secrecy outage probability of the LBB u scheme relative to the NB and full-CSI schemes. Here, we assume a uniform distribution of θ E , i.e. θ E ∼ U[0, 2π ], and we then average the secrecy outage probability for all θ E to obtain the average secrecy outage probability for each scheme. As expected, we observe that the average secrecy outage probability of the LBB u scheme is lower than that of the NB scheme, and higher than that of the full-CSI scheme. In addition, we observe that the performance gap between the LBB u scheme and the NB scheme increases as K B increases, and the performance gap between the LBB u scheme and the full-CSI scheme decreases as K B increases. These two observations can be explained by the fact that Bob's location provides more information on the main channel as K B increases (e.g., as K B → ∞, knowing Bob's location is equivalent to knowing the CSI of the main channel). Based on these observations, we can conclude that the LBB u scheme is preferable when the Rician K -factor is large.
We note that the performance gain of the full-CSI scheme relative to the LBB u scheme is achieved at the cost of high implementation complexities. In comparison, the LBB u scheme only requires Bob's location. Taking the feedback overhead as an example, the full-CSI scheme requires N A complex numbers to be fed back, while feeding back Bob's location only requires two real numbers. As we can see from Fig. 6 , the performance gap between the LBB u scheme and the full-CSI scheme increases as N A increases. This demonstrates the tradeoff between the system performance and the system complexity.
V. DISCUSSIONS
It is worth mentioning how relaxation of some assumptions we have made impacts our results. Of course, in reality it will never be the case that all reported locations, all K map information, and all path loss exponents are known with zero error. Errors in these quantities are intermingled in the sense that an error in one leads to an error in another. We have attempted to encompass such correlated errors in a range of additional simulations. Our general result is that a percentage error of 15% in any of these inputs leads to an approximately 10% percentage error in our reported outage probabilities. For anticipated error inputs, we can therefore say that our analysis remains reasonably accurate.
We have assumed that Alice, Bob, and Eve are static. However, we note that our proposed LBB scheme can be deployed in mobile environments. Our analysis holds in such environments as long as Bob and Eve are exposed to a reasonable sample of the possible channel realizations. This requires the coherence time of the channel to be much shorter than the timescale associated with the receiver mobility. This timescale is set by the spatial distance over which the channel changes significantly divided by the relative velocity of the transceivers. This requirement is met for most application scenarios of wireless communications [34] , [35] .
We note that in this work we focus on a 3-node scenario, which serves as the basis of a networking scenario. For example, in the networking scenario Alice can serve several Bob's by utilizing time division multiple access (TDMA) techniques (e.g., Alice serves one Bob at each time slot), and thus the networking scenario can be treated as a 3-node scenario for each time slot. We would also like to highlight that we consider multiple antennas at Eve while assuming that Eve applies MRC to combine the received signals at different antennas. This latter consideration basically captures a practical networking scenario with multiple cooperating single-antenna eavesdroppers. A more detailed exploration of the many-node networking scenario beyond TDMA schemes could be considered in future works.
Although the adopted Rician fading channel model is more general than the Rayleigh fading channel model, in practice real wireless channels may be more complex again than Rician fading channels. For example, a wireless channel may consist of multiple deterministic components and scattered components. As long as these deterministic components are known, we can incorporate them into h o and G o in (1) and (3), respectively. Based on our analysis presented in Section III-A, we know that the pdfs of γ B and γ E derived in (16) and (22) , respectively, are still valid when we replace the LOS component with multiple known deterministic components in the channel model. This is due to the fact that this replacement only changes the values of the effective Rician K -factor and average SNR (e.g., K B , γ B ). As such, our derived secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme given in (25) is still valid for such a replacement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed and analyzed a novel beamforming scheme in the wiretap channel where both the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are subject to Rician fading. Our new LBB scheme solely requires as inputs the location information of Bob and Eve, and does not require the CSI of the main channel or the eavesdropper's channel being available at Alice. We derived the secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme in an easy-to-evaluate expression valid for arbitrary real values of K B and K E . We then determined the optimal location-based beamformer that minimizes the secrecy outage probability. Comparisons with a range of other schemes were then carried out so as to better understand the performance gains offered by our location-based solution. The work we presented will be important for a range of application scenarios in which Rician channels are expected to be dominant and where location information of potential users and adversaries are known.
APPENDIX A SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE NB SCHEME
In the NB scheme, Alice distributes her total transmit power uniformly among the N A orthogonal independent transmit directions (i.e., the covariance matrix of bx is PI N A /N A ) [36] , [37] . Then, the SNR at Bob is given by [36] , [37] γ NB
Interpreting Rician fading as a special case of Nakagami fading, the pdf of γ NB B can be approximated by
We assume that Eve applies MRC to combine the received signals at different antenna elements. As such, the SNR at Eve is given by
where s 0 is the N E × 1 eigenvector for the largest eigenvalue λ 0 of G. The theoretical expression for the distribution of λ 2 0 has been derived in [38] . However, this expression is too complicated to be used for further analysis. To make progress, we adopt the simple approximation for the pdf of λ 2 0 proposed in [39] . As such, the pdf of γ NB E can be approximated by
where λ 0 is the mean of the per-branch largest eigenvalue (i.e., λ 0 = E[λ 0 ]/N A N E ). The value of λ 0 can be approximated by [39] 
We note that we have λ 0 = 1 for arbitrary real K E when N E = 1.
Following a similar procedure to that used in deriving O(R s ) in Theorem 1, the secrecy outage probability of the NB scheme is derived as
As per (49), we can see that the secrecy outage probability of the NB scheme is independent of θ B and θ E . However, (49) is a function of γ B and γ E , which are dependent on d B and d E , respectively.
APPENDIX B SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE FULL-CSI SCHEME
In the full-CSI scheme Alice knows the CSI of the main channel, but does not know the CSI or location of Eve. Then, Alice adopts h † / h as the beamformer b to maximize the SNR of the main channel [37] , [40] in order to minimize the secrecy outage probability.
Following a similar procedure to that used in deriving O(R s ) in Theorem 1, the secrecy outage probability of the full-CSI scheme is then derived as
wherem E = (K E + 1) 2 /(2K E + 1),
(52)
